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Abstract—This paper studies the wireless surveillance of a
hybrid automatic repeat request (HARQ) based suspicious com-
munication link over Rayleigh fading channels. We propose a
proactive eavesdropping approach, where a half-duplex monitor
can opportunistically jam the suspicious link to exploit its
potential retransmissions for overhearing more efficiently. In
particular, we consider that the suspicious link uses at most
two HARQ rounds for transmitting the same data packet, and
we focus on two cases without and with HARQ combining
at the monitor receiver. In both cases, we aim to maximize
the successful eavesdropping probability at the monitor, by
adaptively allocating the jamming power in the first HARQ
round according to fading channel conditions, subject to an
average jamming power constraint. For both cases, we show
that the optimal jamming power allocation follows a threshold-
based policy, and the monitor jams with constant power when the
eavesdropping channel gain is less than the threshold. Numerical
results show that the proposed proactive eavesdropping scheme
achieves higher successful eavesdropping probability than the
conventional passive eavesdropping, and HARQ combining can
help further improve the eavesdropping performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in user-controlled wireless networks and
devices such as ad hoc networks and drones have posed
new threats to public security, since they can be misused
to facilitate or commit crimes and terror attacks. In order to
prevent or defend against such misuse, there is a growing need
for authorized parties to legitimately monitor and eavesdrop
suspicious communication links. In this case, different from
conventional wireless security that assumes communication
links are rightful and aims to maximize the secrecy rate against
illegal eavesdropping [1], we consider a new wireless surveil-
lance paradigm that focuses on legitimately eavesdropping
suspicious wireless communication links [2]–[8].
Passive eavesdropping is a commonly adopted wireless
surveillance approach, which, however, is unable to overhear
the suspicious communications clearly once the legitimate
monitors (eavesdroppers) are far away from suspicious trans-
mitters (STs), due to the severe path-loss and channel fading
of the eavesdropping link. To cope with this issue, proactive
eavesdropping via jamming has been proposed in [3]–[5],
where a full-duplex monitor sends jamming signals to interfere
with the suspicious receiver (SR) to moderate the suspicious
link transmission parameters (such as power and/or rate), for
facilitating the simultaneous eavesdropping. By exploiting the
channel fluctuations over time, the monitor can adaptively
adjust its jamming power based on instantaneous channel
conditions, for improving the eavesdropping performance [3].
It is worth noting that the above works largely focus on
maximizing the eavesdropping capacity of the monitor assisted
with jamming, in which the same packet is transmitted once
in the suspicious communication link. In practice, however,
most wireless communication systems are operated based on
hybrid automatic repeat request (HARQ) protocols to ensure
reliable communications, where the transmitter may retransmit
the same packet if the receiver fails to decode [9], [10].
Furthermore, the existing works assume full-duplex monitors
with simultaneous jamming and eavesdropping, but the perfor-
mance is practically limited by the self-interference from the
jamming to the eavesdropping antennas at the monitor [11].
To overcome these limitations, this paper studies the wire-
less surveillance of an HARQ-based suspicious communica-
tion link via a practical half-duplex legitimate monitor over
Rayleigh fading channels. We consider that the suspicious
communication link implements the HARQ protocol as fol-
lows. Initially, the ST transmits a coded packet to the SR;
depending on whether the SR decodes it successfully or not, it
replies an acknowledgement (ACK) or negative acknowledge-
ment (NACK); upon receiving a NACK, the ST retransmits
the same coded packet again. This operation is repeated until
either an ACK is received or the number of retransmissions
exceeds a maximum threshold. Under this setup, we propose
a proactive eavesdropping approach, where the monitor op-
portunistically jams the suspicious link to exploit its potential
retransmissions for overhearing more efficiently.
In particular, we assume the number of HARQ rounds for
the suspicious communication to be two with at most one
retransmission for the same packet.1 In this case, the monitor
must work in the eavesdropping mode without any jamming in
the second HARQ round, since the half-duplex monitor cannot
jam and eavesdrop the suspicious link at the same time, and
there will be no more retransmissions of the same packet that
can be eavesdropped. We focus on two cases without and with
HARQ combining at the monitor receiver, which decodes each
retransmitted packet independently, or combines all previously
1If more than one retransmissions are allowed, our eavesdropping perfor-
mance is expected to be further improved, as there will be more chances for
the monitor to jam and eavesdrop the suspicious link retransmissions.
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Fig. 1. Wireless surveillance of an HARQ-based suspicious communication
link, where the legitimate monitor opportunistically jams the suspicious link
to increase the chance of its retransmission for proactive eavesdropping.
received copies of the same packet to decode with maximum
ratio combining (MRC), respectively.2 In both cases, we aim
to maximize the successful eavesdropping probability at the
monitor, by adaptively allocating the jamming power in the
first HARQ round based on fading channel conditions, subject
to an average jamming power constraint. For both cases,
we show that the optimal jamming power allocation follows
a threshold-based policy, in which the monitor jams with
constant power when the eavesdropping channel gain is less
than a threshold; otherwise, the jamming power is zero and the
monitor eavesdrops in the first round. Specifically, we find that
with HARQ combining, the threshold is generally smaller than
the case without HARQ combining; therefore, in this case the
monitor prefers jamming only when the eavesdropping channel
gain is even weaker. Finally, numerical results show that
the proposed proactive eavesdropping schemes achieve higher
successful eavesdropping probability than the conventional
passive eavesdropping, and HARQ combining can help further
improve the eavesdropping performance.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1, a half-duplex legitimate monitor aims
to overhear a suspicious communication link from an ST to an
SR, which employs the HARQ protocol with two transmission
rounds at most for the same packet. In this case, the monitor
must work in the eavesdropping mode without any jamming
in the second HARQ round, and can jam or eavesdrop (but
not at the same time) in the first round. Intuitively, jamming
the SR in the first round can increase the probability of packet
retransmission in the second round of the suspicious link, but
lose the chance of eavesdropping it in the first round.
We consider a quasi-static channel model, where wireless
channels remain unchanged at each transmission round of one
packet, but can change independently over different rounds
and for different packets. Let gti denote the channel power gain
2With the same packet retransmitted, the considered HARQ protocol with
MRC is referred to as “chase combining (CC)” in practice [10]. There is
another HARQ protocol with combining, namely “incremental redundancy
(IR)”, where if a NACK is received, the ST transmits additional coded bits,
instead of retransmitting the same packet. Our results in this paper can also
be extended to the case of IR, which is left for future work.
of link i at the t-th transmission round for one packet, where
i = 0, 1, and 2 represent the suspicious link, the eavesdropping
link, and the jamming link, respectively. Here, t = I and t = II
denote the initial transmission and the retransmission rounds of
the same packet, respectively. Rayleigh fading is considered,
where for any t ∈ {I, II}, gti follows an exponential distri-
bution with the rate parameter λi (or the mean value 1/λi),
i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. We consider that at each transmission round t,
the channel state information (CSI) gt0 of the suspicious link
is only available at the SR. Therefore, the ST adopts a fixed
transmit power P0 and a fixed data rate R (in bps/Hz) to
deliver different packets over time. It is also assumed that at
the beginning of round t = I, the monitor perfectly knows
the CSI gI1 of the eavesdropping link via efficient channel
estimation based on the received pilot signal from the ST, and
it also knows the channel distribution information (CDI) of
all the three links (i.e., the values of λi’s) based on long-term
observation.
Based on the CSI gI1 of the eavesdropping link, in round
t = I the monitor can adaptively adjust its power for jam-
ming or just eavesdrop without jamming to maximize the
surveillance performance over the HARQ-based suspicious
communication. Let Q(gI1) ≥ 0 denote the jamming power in
round t = I based on the exactly known gI1, where Q(g
I
1) = 0
tells that the monitor eavesdrops without jamming in the first
round. Our objective is to optimize the jamming powerQ(gI1)’s
according to the eavesdropping channel condition gI1’s over
time to maximize the successful eavesdropping probability (to
be defined later), subject to an average jamming power budget.
We address this problem in the following by considering
two cases without and with HARQ combining at the monitor
receiver, respectively.
III. OPTIMAL JAMMING WITHOUT HARQ COMBINING
In this section, we consider that if the monitor fails to
decode the packet in the initial transmission round t = I, it will
discard the packet in this round; then in any retransmission
round t = II, it will only use the retransmitted packet for
decoding, for ease of implementation. In the following, we first
derive the successful eavesdropping probability under given
jamming power Q(gI1) for any given g
I
1. Then, we decide
the jamming power allocation to maximize the successful
eavesdropping probability by considering all possible values
of gI1’s over time given the average jamming power budget.
A. Successful Eavesdropping Probability Under Given gI1 and
Q(gI1)
In this subsection, we obtain the successful eavesdrop-
ping probability under any given gI1 and Q(g
I
1), denoted as
Peav(g
I
1, Q(g
I
1)). In particular, we have either Q(g
I
1) > 0 (in
jamming mode) or Q(gI1) = 0 (in eavesdropping mode) in
round t = I.
1) Jamming with Q(gI1) > 0: In this case, the monitor can
only overhear the retransmission in round t = II, provided
that the suspicious transmission in round t = I fails. First, we
obtain the probability of suspicious retransmission, which is
equivalent to the outage probability at the SR after the initial
transmission of the ST in round t = I. In this round, the
received signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) at the
SR is
γI0(Q(g
I
1)) =
gI0P0
gI2Q(g
I
1) + σ
2
, (1)
where σ2 denotes the noise power at the receiver. Note that
gI0 and g
I
2 are independent exponentially distributed variables
with rate parameters λ0 and λ2, respectively. By letting
γ¯ = 2R − 1 (2)
denote the minimum received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) or
SINR requirement for successfully decoding the packet by
assuming the optimal Gaussian signalling employed, we have
the probability of suspicious retransmission as [4]
pI-out0 (Q(g
I
1)) = P(γ
I
0(Q(g
I
1)) < γ¯)
=1−
λ2/(γ¯Q(g
I
1))
λ0/P0 + λ2/(γ¯Q(gI1))
e−λ0σ
2γ¯/P0 . (3)
Next, we obtain the conditional successful eavesdropping
probability of the monitor in round t = II, denoted by pII-suc1 .
In this round, the received SNR at the monitor is given as
γII1 = g
II
1P0/σ
2. As gII1 is exponentially distributed with the
rate parameter λ1, we have
pII-suc1 =P(γ
II
1 ≥ γ¯) = e
−λ1σ
2γ¯/P0 . (4)
By combining the probability pI-out0 (Q(g
I
1)) of suspicious
retransmission in (3) and the conditional successful eaves-
dropping probability pII-suc1 in (4), we have the successful
eavesdropping probability under given gI1 and Q(g
I
1) > 0 as
Peav(g
I
1, Q(g
I
1)) = p
II-suc
1 p
I-out
0 (Q(g
I
1))
= e−λ1σ
2γ¯/P0 −
λ2P0
λ0γ¯Q(gI1) + λ2P0
e−(λ0+λ1)σ
2γ¯/P0
, Φ(Q(gI1)). (5)
Note that the function Φ(Q(gI1)) is independent of g
I
1, and
is monotonically increasing and concave with respect to the
jamming power Q(gI1) ≥ 0.
2) Eavesdropping with Q(gI1) = 0: In this case, the
received SNR at the monitor is γI1 = g
I
1P0/σ
2. If γI1 is no
smaller than the minimum SNR requirement γ¯ in (2) (i.e,
γI1 ≥ γ¯), or equivalently g
I
1 ≥ g¯ , γ¯σ
2/P0, the monitor
can successfully decode the ST’s transmitted packet in this
round, no matter whether the retransmission of the suspicious
link occurs or not. Here, we have the successful eavesdropping
probability under given gI1 ≥ g¯ and Q(g
I
1) = 0 as
Peav(g
I
1, Q(g
I
1)) = 1. (6)
On the other hand, if γI1 < γ¯ or equivalently g
I
1 < g¯, the
monitor cannot decode the packet in round t = I. Therefore,
it can only overhear the retransmission in round t = II, under
the condition that the suspicious transmission in round t = I
fails. The successful eavesdropping probability in this case can
be similarly obtained as that in (5). By replacing Q(gI1) > 0
in (5) as Q(gI1) = 0, we have the successful eavesdropping
probability under given gI1 < g¯ and Q(g
I
1) = 0 as
Peav(g
I
1, Q(g
I
1)) = Φ(0), (7)
where Φ(·) is given in (5).
By combining Peav(g
I
1, Q(g
I
1)) in (5), (6), and (7), it follows
that the successful eavesdropping probability under any given
gI1 and Q(g
I
1) is obtained as
Peav(g
I
1, Q(g
I
1)) =


Φ(Q(gI1)), if Q(g
I
1) > 0,
1, if Q(gI1) = 0 and g
I
1 ≥ g¯,
Φ(0), if Q(gI1) = 0 and g
I
1 < g¯.
(8)
B. Successful Eavesdropping Probability Maximization
Our objective is to maximize the successful eavesdropping
probability over all possible gI1’s, subject to the average
jamming power budget at the monitor, denoted by Qave > 0.
Towards this end, we adaptively allocate the jamming power
Q(gI1)’s based on the exact CSI observation of g
I
1’s for
different packets. The optimization problem for the monitor
is formulated as
(P1) : max
{Q(gI1)≥0}
EgI1
(
Peav(g
I
1, Q(g
I
1))
)
s.t. EgI1
(
Q(gI1)
)
≤ Qave, (9)
where EgI1
(·) denotes the expectation operation over gI1. We
have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1: The optimal jamming power solution to
problem (P1) is given as
Q∗(gI1) =
{
0, ∀gI1 ≥ g¯
Qave
1−e−λ1σ
2 γ¯/P0
, ∀gI1 < g¯
. (10)
Proof: Under any packet transmission with gI1 ≥ g¯, it is
evident that setting the jamming power as Q(gI1) = 0 achieves
Peav(g
I
1, Q(g
I
1)) = 1 in (6), while setting Q(g
I
1) > 0 achieves
Peav(g
I
1, Q(g
I
1)) < 1 in (5). Therefore, we have Q
∗(gI1) = 0
for any gI1 ≥ g¯.
Next, consider another packet transmission with gI1 < g¯.
In this case, by combining (5) and (7), it is evident that
Peav(g
I
1, Q(g
I
1)) is a monotonically increasing and concave
function with respect to the jamming power Q(gI1) ≥ 0, but
irrespective of gI1. Based on the Jensen’s inequality, it is opti-
mal to set the jamming power to be identical, i.e., Q∗(gI1) =
Q∗, ∀gI1 < g¯. Furthermore, note that the optimality of (P1) is
achieved when the average jamming power constraint is met
with strict equality. Notice that P(gI1 < g¯) = 1− e
−λ1σ
2γ¯/P0 .
Then it follows that (1− e−λ1σ
2γ¯/P0) ·Q∗ = Qave. Therefore,
we have Q∗(gI1) = Q
∗ = Qave
1−e−λ1σ
2γ¯/P0
for any gI1 < g¯.
By combining the above two scenarios, this proposition is
verified.
From Proposition 3.1, it is observed that the optimal
jamming power allocation follows a threshold-based policy.
When the eavesdropping channel gain gI1 is larger than or
equal to the threshold g¯, the monitor does not jam as it can
successfully eavesdrop; otherwise, when gI1 is smaller than g¯, it
is optimal for the monitor to employ constant-power jamming
to maximize the probability of retransmission and hence the
successful eavesdropping probability.
IV. OPTIMAL JAMMING WITH HARQ COMBINING
In this section, we consider that if the SR or the monitor fails
to decode the packet eavesdropped in the initial transmission
(t = I), it will use it to combine with the retransmitted packet
in the second round (t = II) via the MRC technique.
A. Successful Eavesdropping Probability Under Given gI1 and
Q(gI1)
In the following, we obtain the successful eavesdrop-
ping probability under any given gI1 and Q(g
I
1), denoted as
Pˆeav(g
I
1, Q(g
I
1)).
1) Jamming with Q(gI1) > 0: In this case, eavesdropping is
not feasible at the monitor in round t = I, and hence, no MRC
is implementable. Therefore, the successful eavesdropping
probability under given gI1 andQ(g
I
1) > 0 is same as that in (5)
without HARQ combining, i.e., Pˆeav(g
I
1, Q(g
I
1)) = Φ(Q(g
I
1)).
2) Eavesdropping with Q(gI1) = 0: When g
I
1 ≥ g¯, the
eavesdropping is always successful in round t = I. Therefore,
we have the successful eavesdropping probability under given
gI1 ≥ g¯ and Q(g
I
1) = 0 as Pˆeav(g
I
1, Q(g
I
1)) = 1.
When gI1 < g¯, the eavesdropping is not successful at round
t = I. Nevertheless, if retransmission occurs, the monitor can
implement MRC to combine the two copies of the same packet
that are received in the two rounds, respectively. First, note that
the probability of retransmission can be similarly obtained as
that in (3) by calculating the outage probability of suspicious
transmission. As no jamming is employed here, we have the
probability of retransmission as
pI-out0 (0) = 1− e
−λ0σ
2γ¯/P0 , (11)
with pI-out0 (Q(g
I
1)) given in (3).
Next, we derive the conditional successful eavesdropping
probability under given gI1 when retransmission occurs, de-
noted as pˆI+II-suc1 (g
I
1). With MRC, the received SNR at the
monitor is given as
γI1 + γ
II
1 =
(gI1 + g
II
1 )P0
σ2
. (12)
As gII1 is exponentially distributed with rate parameter λ1, we
have
pˆI+II-suc1 (g
I
1) = P
(
γI1 + γ
II
1 ≥ γ¯
)
= P
(
gII1 ≥
σ2γ¯
P0
− gI1
)
= e−
γ¯λ1σ
2
P0
+gI1λ1 . (13)
Then, by taking into account the probability of retransmis-
sion pI-out0 (0) in (11), we have the successful eavesdropping
probability under given gI1 < g¯ and Q(g
I
1) = 0 as
Pˆeav(g
I
1, Q(g
I
1)) = pˆ
I+II-suc
1 (g
I
1) · p
I-out
0 (0)
=e−γ¯λ1σ
2
1/P0+g
I
1λ1(1− e−λ0σ
2γ¯/P0) = eg
I
1λ1Φ(0). (14)
By combining the above cases, it follows that with HARQ
combining, the successful eavesdropping probability under any
given gI1 and Q(g
I
1) is
Pˆeav(g
I
1, Q(g
I
1)) =


Φ(Q(gI1)), if Q(g
I
1) > 0,
1, if Q(gI1) = 0 and g
I
1 ≥ g¯,
eg
I
1λ1Φ(0), if Q(gI1) = 0 and g
I
1 < g¯.
(15)
By comparing (15) with (8), it is evident that their only
difference lies in the case when the monitor chooses to
overhear in round t = I (i.e.,Q(gI1) = 0) but the eavesdropping
in round t = I is not successful (i.e., gI1 < g¯). Thanks to the
MRC, the successful eavesdropping probability increases by a
factor of eg
I
1λ1 > 1 in (15).
B. Successful Eavesdropping Probability Maximization
With HARQ combining, the successful eavesdropping prob-
ability maximization problem is formulated as
(P2) : max
{Q(gI1)≥0}
EgI1
(
Pˆeav(g
I
1, Q(g
I
1))
)
s.t. EgI1
(
Q(gI1)
)
≤ Qave. (16)
Note that problem (P2) is more challenging to solve than (P1).
This is due to the fact that under any given gI1 < g¯, the
function Pˆeav(g
I
1, Q(g
I
1)) is non-convex as it is discontinuous
for Q(gI1) = 0. Despite this fact, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.1: The optimal jamming power allocation
{Q⋆(gI1)} to problem (P2) follows a threshold-based policy,
given by
Q⋆(gI1) =
{ √
λ2P0
λ0γ¯µ⋆
e−(λ0σ
2
0+λ1σ
2
1)γ¯/P0 − λ2P0λ0γ¯ , ∀g
I
1 ≤ g¯
⋆
0, ∀gI1 > g¯
⋆,
(17)
with the threshold g¯⋆ given as
g¯
⋆
= min
(
g¯,
1
λ1
ln
(
1 +
(√
µ⋆λ2P0
λ0γ¯
−
√
e
−
(λ0σ
2+λ1σ
2)γ¯
P0
)
2
e
−
λ1σ
2 γ¯
P0 − e
−
(λ0+λ1)σ
2 γ¯
P0
))
.
(18)
Here, µ⋆ satisfying
0 ≤ µ⋆ ≤
λ0γ¯
λ2P0
e−(λ0σ
2
0+λ1σ
2
1)γ¯/P0 (19)
corresponds to a parameter such that E(Q⋆(gI1)) = Qave.
Proof: See Appendix A.
By comparing Proposition 4.1 with Proposition 3.1, it is
observed from (18) that the threshold g¯⋆ for (P2) is smaller
than g¯ for (P1). This shows that with the HARQ combining,
the monitor may not jam even when it cannot successfully
eavesdrop in the initial round. For illustration, we provide a
numerical example in Fig. 2 to show the thresholds for (P1)
and (P2), for which the parameters are set as in Section V later.
It is observed that with the jamming power Qave increasing,
the threshold g¯⋆ for the case with HARQ combining increases
monotonically. This indicates that with more jamming power,
the monitor should distribute its jamming power over more
packets when eavesdropping fails in the initial round.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to evaluate
the performance of our proposed proactive eavesdropping
schemes as compared to the conventional passive eavesdrop-
ping without jamming, i.e., Q(gI1) = 0, ∀g
I
1. In the simulation,
we normalize the noise powers at the SR and the monitor
as σ2 = 1, set the average channel power gain of the
Rayleigh fading suspicious, eavesdropping, and jamming links
as 1/λ0 = 1, 1/λ1 = 0.2, and 1/λ2 = 0.2, respectively.
Furthermore, we fix the transmit power by the ST as P0 = 10
dB.
Fig. 3 shows the successful eavesdropping probability at
the monitor versus the average jamming power Qave, where
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versus with combining.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
Average jamming power, Q
ave
 (dB)
Su
cc
es
sf
ul
 e
av
es
dr
op
pi
ng
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
 (%
)
 
 
Passive eavesdropping w/o combining
Optimal jamming w/o combining
Passive eavesdropping w/ combining
Optimal jamming w/ combining
Fig. 3. The successful eavesdropping probability versus the average jamming
power Qave, where R = 2 bps/Hz.
the communication rate at the suspicious link is R = 2
bps/Hz. It is observed that no matter without or with HARQ
jamming, the proposed proactive eavesdropping achieves much
higher successful eavesdropping probability than the respective
passive eavesdropping case. It is also observed that for both
passive and proactive eavesdropping, HARQ combining gen-
erally helps further improve the eavesdropping performance.
Nevertheless, when Qave becomes large, the proactive eaves-
dropping with HARQ combining is observed to achieve a
similar eavesdropping performance as that without HARQ
combining. This can be explained based on Fig. 2, where as
Qave becomes large, the threshold g¯
⋆ with HARQ combining
increases towards g¯, the threshold for the case without comb-
ing. In this case, the monitor needs to jam over more packets
when the eavesdropping fails in the initial round, over which
the HARQ combining is not applicable, thus making the two
schemes perform similar.
Fig. 4 shows the successful eavesdropping probability ver-
sus the suspicious communication rate R, where the average
jamming power is Qave = 20 dB. It is observed that at
small R values, passive (proactive) eavesdropping with HARQ
combining achieves similar eavesdropping performance as that
without HARQ combining. This is due to the fact that with
small R, the eavesdropping is likely to be successful in the
initial round, and thus no HARQ combining is required.
By contrast, at large R values, eavesdropping with HARQ
combining is observed to perform better than that without
HARQ combining, as retransmission occurs with a higher
probability.
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rate R at the suspicious communication, where Qave = 20dB.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a new wireless surveillance scenario
over an HARQ-based suspicious communication link via a
half-duplex monitor. We proposed a proactive eavesdropping
via jamming based approach, where the monitor jams op-
portunistically to improve the surveillance performance via
exploiting the potential retransmission in the suspicious link.
In both cases without and with HARQ combining at the
monitor receiver, we showed that the optimal jamming power
allocation follows a threshold-based policy, where the monitor
jams with a constant power in the initial round when the
eavesdropping channel gain is less than a threshold. It is hoped
that this paper can provide new insights on exploiting the
retransmission in practical HARQ protocols to improve the
performance of wireless surveillance.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 4.1
Though problem (P2) is non-convex in general, it satisfies
the so-called time-sharing condition in [12]. Therefore, strong
duality or zero duality gap holds between problem (P2) and its
dual problem. Therefore, we use the Lagrange duality method
to obtain the optimal solution.
Let µ ≥ 0 denote the dual variable associated with the av-
erage jamming power constraint. Then the partial Lagrangian
of (P2) is denoted as
L({Q(gI1)}, µ) =EgI1
(
Pˆeav(g
I
1, Q(g
I
1))
)
− µ
(
EgI1
(
Q(gI1)
)
−Qave
)
. (20)
The dual function is given as
ψ(µ) = max
{Q(gI1)≥0}
L({Q(gI1)}, µ). (21)
The dual problem is
(D2) : min
µ≥0
ψ(µ). (22)
Due to the strong duality between (P2) and (D2), we solve (P2)
by first solving problem (21) to obtain the dual function ψ(µ)
under any given µ ≥ 0, and then solving (D2) via searching
over {Q(gI1)} to minimize g(µ).
1) Solving Problem (21) Under Given µ ≥ 0: Problem (21)
can be decomposed into various subproblems each for one gI1.
max
Q(gI1)≥0
Pˆeav(Q(g
I
1))− µQ(g
I
1). (23)
We solve problem (23) by considering gI1 ≥ g¯ and g
I
1 < g¯,
respectively. First, for any gI1 ≥ g¯, it is evident that the optimal
solution to problem (23) is given as
Q˜(gI1) = 0, ∀g
I
1 ≥ g¯, (24)
with the achieved optimal value being 1.
Next, consider problem (23) for any given gI1 < g¯. In this
case, problem (23) can be solved by considering two regimes
with Q(gI1) = 0 and Q(g
I
1) > 0, respectively.
In the regime with Q(gI1) = 0, the achieved objective value
for problem (23) is a constant v0(g
I
1) = e
gI1λ1Φ(0).
In the other regime with Q(gI1) > 0, problem (23) becomes
max
Q(gI1)>0
Φ(Q(gI1)) − µQ(g
I
1). (25)
As Φ(Q(gI1)) is concave over Q(g
I
1) ≥ 0, this problem is
convex. By checking the first-order derivative of the objective
function, the optimal solution to problem (25) is derived as
Q¯µ (irrespective of g
I
1). If µ ≤
λ0γ¯
λ2P0
e−(λ0σ
2
0+λ1σ
2
1)γ¯/P0 , we
have
Q¯µ =
√
λ2P0
λ0γ¯µ
e−(λ0+λ1)σ2γ¯/P0 −
λ2P0
λ0γ¯
, (26)
with the achieved objective value given as
vµ =
(√
µλ2P0
λ0γ¯
−
√
e−(λ0σ
2
0+λ1σ
2
1)γ¯/P0
)2
+Φ(0). (27)
Otherwise, if µ > λ0γ¯λ2P0 e
−(λ0σ
2
0+λ1σ
2
1)γ¯/P0 , we have Q¯µ = 0
and vµ = Φ(0).
By comparing v0(g
I
1) versus vµ for the two regimes, the
optimal solution to problem (23) under gI1 < g¯1 is given as
Q˜(gI1) =
{
Q¯µ, if vµ > v0(g
I
1)
0, if vµ < v0(g
I
1),
, ∀gI1 < g¯. (28)
2) Finding Optimal µ ≥ 0 to Solve (D2): Next, we solve
(D2) to find the optima µ, denoted by µ⋆. It is easy to show
that at the optimality of (P2), the average jamming power
constraint must be tight. Therefore, the optimal µ⋆ can be
found by using the equation EgI1(Q˜(g
I
1)) = Qave, with Q˜(g
I
1)
given in (24) and (28).
Under µ⋆, the corresponding Q˜(gI1)’s in (28) become the
optimal jamming power allocation Q⋆(gI1)’s for (P2). After
some simple manipulation, we can further show that (19) must
hold in order for the jamming power constraint to be tight.
With (19), we can obtain (17) based on (28). Hence, this
proposition is proved.
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